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Introduction
In many western democracies the parliamentary institution suffers from a
characteristic paradox. In theory it continues to be considered important in so far
as it is thought to embody a complex of fundamental ideas which are held as
essential for the legitimation of democracy, especially that of popular sovereignty
and representation.
Parliamentary practice, however, frequently rises widespread desillusion
leading up to the perception of a generalized crisis of modern parliament. The
"decline of parliament" thesis finds in each country and at all times specific
formulations and different explanations. In France it was the transitions from the IV.
to the V. Republic which deprived the national assembly of a large part of its
prerogatives with respect to the executive and the president (Birnbaum 1978,
1980). In the United States, since the last century complaints about the weakening
of the role of the Congress vis-a-vis the President return periodically. In Great
Britain, already in the middle of the last century, parliament was seen just as the
facade of British political life, which was conceived instead essentially shaped by
the council of ministers (Bagehot 1867); in the seventies of this century, the
laments were that the executive controled the legislature rather than the way round
(Walkland/Ryle 1977). In the Federal Republic of Germany, the neo-marxist
parliamentary critique since the end of the sixties complains about the lack of
transparence and of citizen-participation in parliamentary activities. (Abendroth
1967; Agnoli/Brückner 1967). The trend towards neo-corporatist interest
intermediation, which had been observed and theorized during the seventies in
several west European polities (Schmitter 1974, 1977, 1982) provided a further
argument to the thesis which holds that contemporary parliamentary decision-
making processes were progressively undermined or by-passed by competitive,
or even alternative circuits.
In a number of countries, however, parliament seems to have experienced
recently not decline and crisis, but rather substantial rise and reinforcement. Telling
examples for this trend are
- Italy, where in the midst of a profound social and institucional crisis in the late
sixties and during the seventies a debate on the so-called “parliamentary
centrality” developed. This topic had already concerned the Italian constituent
assembly in 1946/7 and had found its expression in the Constitution of the Italian
Republic with its strong parliamentary connotation (Cotto 1984, Ingrao 1985). The
reform of the parliamentary standing orders in 1971 were correspondingly
designed to increase parliamentary decision-making powers and direct relations
with social subjects and thus to make it the "geometrical center of the social and
institucional pluralism" (Cheli 1981);
- In Spain, parliamentary negotiations among the top elite of all major parties
during the constituent process and the first legislature (1977-82) revealed to be
capable instruments in diminishing the traditional conflict between the Spanish
Left, Right and, the Nationalists, and became a “symbol of tolerance". Due to the
moderating effect of a group of professional parliamentarians the Cortes thus
became the major protagonist in the instauration of the new democratic regime in
Spain, and a model for the importance of parliament in the transition to democracy
(Capo 1981-1989);
- Portugal, where the souvereignty of the national assembly at the beginning of the
democratic transition in 1974 was principally restricted and subordinated to the
military organs, but experienced within less than a decade a striking increase of
authority and influence, both on the symbolic and instrumental level (Braga da
Cruz/Lobo Antunes 1989), which make it -in the eyes of Portuguese public
opinion- one of the three most important centers of political power (CIS 1985);
- the Greek assembly, which though confined by majority governments since the
beginning of democratic transition in 1974, and with little space for consensual
decision-making, has become the major site of Greek political life where
bipolarized conflict between the two major parties of the left and the right and the
ideological battles among them become public (Alivizatos 1989).
Only in Turkey, where transition to democracy restarted in 1982, the
Turkish Grand National Assembly has remained in a completely subordinate
position, in decision-making terms as well as symbolically (Kalaycioglu 1989). In
some aspects comparable to the Portuguese case -in particular with respect to the
restriction of parliamentary souvereignty by the military, among others the General
holding the presidency-, in most others the Turkish parliament represents the most
different case within our Southern European setting, and resembles more Latin
American legislatures, for instance the Argentine one (De Riz 1988).
At one time or the other during the transition to, the consolidation of, new
democratic regimes or the reconsolidation of a democratic regime in crisis, and in
different ways, parliaments in Southern Europe between the seventies and
eighties nearly contemporarily have become major public arenas of partisan
dispute, of encounters with social subjects, of negotiations and important decision-
making. In public opinion, they have been perceived as the new protagonists of
political life. And they have been in part reinforced within their institutional settings
by constitutional or parliamentary reforms.
This phenomenon of parliamentary reinforcement contradicts not only the
anti-liberal and anti-parliamentary traditions existing for instance in Spain and
Portugal. It confounds particularly the "progressive" intellectuals and scholars in
these countries who had just learned the "decline of parliament" thesis from their
international environment. Applying it to their home setting, they found themselves
puzzled with contradicting evidence (Guerra 1982; Cotarelo 1989).
Parliamentary protagonism in new democracies is however corroborated
and explained by some of the recently advanced hypotheses on the potential role
of parliament in regime changes to democracy. According to Leonardo Morlino,
there is one type of, consolidation of democracy in which parliament becomes the
main agent and area where consolidation is achieved in so far as being the central
decision-making arena for parties and groups as opposed to other government
institutions or the party structures themselves (Morlino 1986a:233). Philippe
Schmitter hipothesizes parliament to be, independently from its strength in terms of
decision-making and next to interest groups, the central site where consolidation
occurs, in the sense of where legitimation for the new regime is achieved
(Schmitter 1988). These two positions are put into question by the “minimalist
view" of Giuseppe Di Palma: according to him parliaments are either insufficient
or overdetermining with respect to the solution of the problems involved in
democratic consolidation (Di Palma, 1989).
In the following, we want to show that parliament is central
- if not for established democracies certainly for democratic consolidation. This
hypothesis shall be developed mainly theoretically, but also by drawing on
illustrations from recent case studies in the area of Southern Europe (1). In
particular, we base our study on the assumption that parliament in established
democracies and under conditions of “normality" becomes just site among many
others in political decision-making; even more, its activities become "BORING"
because of their routinization and formalization.
With respect to parliament in consolidating or reconsolidating
democracies, our hunch is that its role is fundamentally different being this
independent from its strength in decision-making terms. Parliament here is
potentially central in so far as it manages to incentivate -more than any other
institution, be it an elected president, an hegemonic party or a representative
governmental body- a fundamental consensus/compromise between a maximum
or political and social forces on the principles of the new order. Parliament may be
central even before its formation and institutionalization in the sense that it may
motivate the political actors to concur in a common project of democratization
parliament contributes to the legitimation of a new regime. Not only as a symbol of
principles of political democracy as popular representation, participation or
souvereignty, but also as a material incentive for the integration of political forces
and the development of a fundamental consensus on a broader or narrower range
of principles of the political, social and economic order.
In order to elaborate these hypotheses, in the following we will develop
three questions:
1. Which are the specific problems that have to be resolved during consolidation
-as opposed to the other stages of processes of regime change to democracy-
and which are the functions of parliament from this point of view?
2. How can we define the concept of the “relative centrality" of parliament refered
to the process of democratic consolidation?
3. Which are the major conditions which enhance or diminish the centrality of
parliament in democratic consolidation?
1. Theories on Democratic Consolidation and the Role of Parliament
1.1 The concept of democratic consolidation (dc): stages and problems
involved
In the present discussion on dc (2) we find no unanimity on which of the
different stages and processes involved in democratic regime change should be
labelled as “consolidation":
Dankwart Rustow (1970) conceives dc as the "habituation phase" that
comes after the initial "preparatory" and the "decision making phase" (3) as the
last of three sequences involved in regime change to democracy. Similarly,
Leonardo Morlino (1986a,b) defines dc as a process of “freezing-adaptation” of
modes of peaceful conflict-resolution, and especially the widening of the legitimacy
of the regime with regard to civil society, and delimits it from the preceding stages
of transition and instauration (4).
Philippe Schmitter (1988) conceives dc as a process synonymous to
"structuration", “routinization", “stabilization" and "institutionalization", which
transforms the “ad hoc patterns" characteristic of the period of transition, "into
stable structures in such a way that the ensuing forms/channels of access,
inclusion/exclusion of actors, resources/strategies for action and rules about
decision-making conform to the basic principle of citizenship" and a "procedural
minimum". Dc is hence a stage overlapping with the preceding "transition to
democracy" as well as with the subsequent period of “persistence of democracy".
At the "heart of the matter" of converting patterns into structures lies the problem of
legitimacy: The patterns must become valued "in and by themselves, not just for
the instrumental benefits they bring", both by those who act in them and by those
who are affected by them, if they are to persist (Schmitter 1988).
Giuseppe Di Palma's "minimalist concept of dc" (Di Palma 1989)
understands consolidation basically as the "crafting of the rules of the game ... so
as to prevent essential players from boycotting the game", "to remove breakdown
potentials ... making all essential players enter into the spirit of democratic
bargain", especially securing "that even difficult players enter the game", and finally
aiming at "keeping players in the game". Only the subsequent process of
democratization involves the time-consuming structuration and institutionalization
of core democratic institutions, while "consolidation" is considered as a more or
less time limited process. However, institutionalization processes may have "their
own impact ... on how the democratic game is continued"; “whether the risk of a
breakdown stays out of the agenda of a new democracy depends also on how
institutions turn out".
Di Palma's concept implies that before we have not overcome additional
"thresholds" built into the process of institutionalization, we will not be able to
ascertain if consolidation.-in the meaning of "keeping players within the game"-
has indeed occured. If players are not asked with respect to the instauration of the
new system (in the case of an exclusionary transition mode) and are able to
mobilize effective anti-system opposition, or if they appear to consent, but in
substance do not, this will only turn out during the stage of the structuration of the
new institutions and their relations with society, subsequent after the "initial"
crafting of the new rules.
Hence we propose to include in our study both stages: that of "democratic
consolidation" in the sense of the instauration of, decision-making on and setting
up of the rules of the game, and that of their structuration, "freezing" and
institutionalization. Hence, the fundamental problems involved in dc are not only the
design of the fundamental rules of the game in a way to prevent break-down
games, but also to institutionalize and eventually modify them in a way to keep the
players within the game, and to de-motivate anti-system oppositions by extending
the legitimation of the new democratic system.
1.2 The role of parliament in democratic consolidation
Traditional and contemporary legislative research usually resorts to a
standard spectrum of parliamentary functions -representation of public interest,
legitimation of public decisions and legislation, formation and control of
government, bringing general problems to the public mind, etc- which are
considered the major tasks of parliament in modern democracies.
Theories and studies on democratic consolidation bring new, less obvious
aspects of parliamentary activity to our mind which may escape our attention
perhaps because they are considered as self-understanding. In the following we
will sketch five main hypotheses of the literature on dc concerning these less
obvious functions of parliament. We will see that the preeminent place is attributed
to the role of parliament in Philippe Schimitter's theory on democratic
consolidation, although his relativist standpoint does not allow him at the same
time to award to it or to any other single institution or set of institutions the status of
particularly democratic or of a norm for successful consolidation (5). Leonardo
Morlino is more prudent: consolidation primarily through and at the level of
parliament is only one -and a relatively rare- case of several types of consolidation.
Rustow remains implicit with his suggestions concerning the role of parliament.
And Giuseppe Di Palma's “minimalist approach" to dc sees parliament near-too
supperfluent.
(1) The minimal role of parliament in “crafting the rules of_ the game"
Di Palma makes strong argument for an only minimal role of parliament in
decision-making on the fundamental rules of the game. According to him,
parliament is either "institutionally insufficient" in so far that if a previous
understanding between the relevant actors does not exist "elections and
parliaments may lose considerable effectiveness as devices to remove
breakdown games”. Or parliament is "an unnecessary surplus", when, explicitly or
implicitly, the significant parties have already come to an understanding before
entering the elections that the electoral context will offer tolerable chances of
representation to all and that the newly elected body will act to constitutionalize the
rules of contestation. In this case the actions of parliament, "though necessary to
further articulation, possibly renegotiation, and finally constitutionalization of the
bargain", may be “more often than we think overdetermining". Because of the
historical tradition that democratic institutions have in southern Europe, the
founding elections of Europe's new democracies -as a tool for democracy- were
hence according to Di Palma a "surplus" and not necessary; as a tool against it,
they "proved late and insufficient". Whereas elections in southern Europe took
place within an already reestablished democratic game, in Latin America they
appeared to be more about democracy. There the electoral and parliamentary
strategy was "one way of convincing reluctant players of the need for a democratic
compromise", despite the absence or weakness of those conditions for
institutional coexistence, more typical of new European democracies. Despite the
presence of a freely elected parliament, democratic consolidation may therefore
not be in sight, as in El Salvador since 1984, or in the Philippines after the fall of
Marcos (Di Palma 1989).
But in so far as Di Palma generalizes a minimal role of parliament as an
"unnecessary surplus" in cases where a democratic consensus among the major
players already exists, he overlooks that precisely the parliamentary resources,
rules and procedures are among the conditions which make such a "pre-" or
"extra-parliamentary" consensus possible. Although not yet formalized and
institutionalized, their mere anticipation in the strategies of the major actors serves
as a selections criteria for potential players, and as an incentive for each of them
to compromise with the other forces. When he refers his thesis to games where
such a democratic consensus does not exist yet, he should not generalize 'his
judgement independently from the amount of resources, rules and procedures with
which the future parliament is going to be endowed by the protagonists of
democratic transitions. This variable may be of crucial importance for the
strategies of potential anti-democratic actors even in system where no larger
parliamentary tradition exists.
(2) Parliament as the central decisional arena in dc
Morlino is not as sceptical about the role of parliament in democratic
consolidation. According to him there exists one type of consolidation which
preeminently takes place at the lever of the parliamentary arena (6). Though
according to him most contemporary processes of democratic consolidation are
cases of consolidation through parties, there does exist a subtype in which
parliament may become the central decisional arena for parties and groups,
instead of other government institutions or the party structures themselves (Morlino
1986a:233).
In his perspective, parliamentary structures and procedures may serve as
the fundamental structures to contain, regulate and encapsulate conflict. At the
bottom of this conception is the assumption that the political actors with their
differing, contrary or even opposed preferences and principles meet in parliament
if certain rules and procedures allow them to establish regular relations of political
exchange or competition, thus preventing them from extra-institutional strategies.
The parliamentarians are seen as belonging to the influential political elite which
as a result of interplay among the different forces establishes an explicit
consensus and takes deliberate decisions with respect to the procedures for
conflict accommodation to be institutionalized. Parliament gains importance for dc
in so far as it develops by this a decisional capacity which enables it to resolve
substantial problems, to revise the juridical order inherited from the authoritarian
regime, neutralize the military (Morlino 1986b: 211, 217).
With respect to the conditions which allow parliament to play such a
central role in decision-making and mediation between the political forces, Morlino
identifies four institutional mechanisms: (a) a parliamentary regime without
presidential institution and without direct elections of the head of the state; (b) a
proportional electoral system, which allows minorities to be represented; (c) a
legislature-executive relationship which is not unbalanced in favour of the last; (d)
decisions being taken by consensus and not by majority (Morlino 1986b/447-448).
These requirements are modelled after the Italian experience, and meet
also in the Spain constituent period: The Italian Parliament (Cotta 1987) and the
Spanish Courts have certainly been decisive in the constituent processes in both
cases (Capo 1981, 1983, 1989). But is it that parliament in presidential or semi-
presidential systems, under conditions of a majoritarian decision-making become
less central to democratic consolidation? Is it that an anglosaxon parliamentary
model being adopted in early stages of democratization makes parliament an
unnecessary variable?.
For a number of reasons, parliaments acquire importance independently
from their weakness or strength in decision-making therms, and independently
from their position in the constitutional configuration of the new institutional setting.
(3) The structuring role of Parliament: state institution, social organisations
and Parliament itself
As parliaments emerge as “subjects/agents in the phase of institution
building", they "assume a central role in the reproduction of democratic consent"
(Di Palma 1969). One of the fundamental levels where the consolidation of a young
democratic regime occurs, is that of discrete institutions and organizations which
have to undergo processes of structurations (Schmitter 1988).
Parliament contributes to this not only by establishing its own rules of
procedure, but also in so far as the convocation of a regular legislature sets in
motion processes which will define the nature and role of territorial representation,
the connection between parties in the electorate and parties in parliament, the
extent of party discipline and/or accountability to constituency pressures, the form
of executive accountability, the autonomy of state and parastate agencies, the
strategies of interest associations and so forth (Schmitter 1988).
Parliament furthermore may be central to the processes of defining the
external status and of regulating the internal structures of the basic institutions of
the regime, "both in the sense that it will have to structure its own operations and
that it will be called upon (however formalistically) to ratify many of the codes and
statutes which will structure the operation of other democratic institutions",
especially of parties, interest associations, and the executive, and which will take
approximately 3 legislatures (ibd.).
Only when the rules and resources of basic democratic institutions, e.g. of
parliament, are "sufficiently .. protected by their own and. other vested interests
and sufficiently endowed with symbolic significance and normative approval in
order to withstand foreseeable changes in their environments", dc will be
accomplished.
(4) Parliament in the structuration of the “electoral" and the "pressure
regime"
The level of "regime structuration" is that where “networks of power among
interdependent or hierarchically ordered institutions" emerge, the so-called "partial
regimes" (7). Also to this aspect of democratic consolidation parliament makes
fundamental contributions: Due to its linkages with parties, parliament is involved
in the structuration of the so-called "electoral regime", and by its interactions with
the interest groups it participates in the constitution of the "pressure regime". In
contemporary democracies, the pressure regime may become "less relevant
since most of the interaction of interest groups takes place directly with involved
state agencies. Parliament, however, is brought in when fundamental changes in
fiscal legislation, welfare measures, etc., are required in order to seal social
contracts drawn up elsewhere" (Schmitter 1988).
The relations which parliament develops with these intermediary forces
enhance the legitimation of the regime structures (Morlino 1986a: 216). Both
"partial regimes" determine the "legitimacy and, hence, viability in the long run of a
given democratic regime" (Schmitter 1988).
(5) Parliament, "hegemonic structuration" and the problem of regime
legitimation
Parliament contributes to dc above all at the level of "hegemonic
structuration", that is with respect to the "rooting" of the emergent regime in the
"social groups whose support or, at least, acquiescence is crucial to their longrun
survival" (Schmitter 1988). The "legitimacy, and, hence, viability in the long run, of a
given democratic regime" depends on the degree to which the partial regimes and
their particular mix allow for satisfactory participation", "accountability to citizen
preferences" and "responsiveness of authorities" to individuals and groups.
How the problem of legitimacy is resolved, and which mix of partial
regimes is consolidated, has an impact on whether a more “societally-centered" or
"state-centered", a “majoritarian" or more "consociational" type of democracy is
emerging (Schmitter 1988).
While the rules of the new game may be worked out also by technical or
governmental bodies the incentives and motivations to play the new game may
also be provided in terms of governmental resources; the crucial reform decisions
can be taken at other sites of the regime; and parliament may remain rather
marginal in the structuration even of itself and the other institutions: it is the
legitimation function and its requirements which make parliament particularly
"central" to the process of democratic consolidation. This aspect shall be dealt
with more profoundly in the following section.
2. The "centrality of parliament" and the problem of parliamentary
legitimation
2.1 The traditional model of the "central parliament"
Traditionally, the concept of “parliamentary centrality" has been interpreted
largely in the sense of “predominance" of parliament vis-a-vis the executive power:
- In the French IV. Republic parliamentary predominance was linked to the
constitutionalization of a sourvereign Assembly with full legislative powers, without
delegated legislation, and a vast control power vis-a-vis government. Parliament
was conceived as the arena in which the mass parties participated in the
elaboration of the general will, and, in particular, of the national policies (Birnbaum
1980);
- in Italy during the seventies, the idea and model of the central parliament meant to
its advocators and opponents “assembly parliamentarism with strengthened
proportionality and scarce unity and authority of the executive" (Long 1985). This
concept seems to represent one of the most significant keys to understand the
historical process which has characterized the developments of the Italian political
system after the II. World war and, in particular, the developments after the crisis of
the center-left governments. The idea goes through the whole republican
experience with alternating fortunes, but becomes more precise only at the end of
the sixties, with the passage from the 5th to the 6th legislature and the strong
social dynamism and the corresponding strong tensions in the functioning of the
political institutions (Cheli 1981: 343/4):
The leader of the Communist Party after the Second World War and
during the Italian constitutional debates, Togliatti, was the first in the communist
tradition to formulate the postulate of parliamentary centrality for the strategy of the
PCI (Sassoon 1988);
Since the sixties and the center-left governments, parliament was
conceived as an “arena of intermediation", first only refered to secondary political
interests, later as the “geometrical site of the social and institutional pluralism", as
an arena of encounter of all political forces, and a site of compensation between
majority and opposition. The corresponding parliamentary function of “mediation"
implied the transformation of law from an expression of the will of the majority into
the product of mediation between majority and opposition. At the same time the
notion of "majority" passed from that of a "government majority" to that of a
"legislative majority" which forms differently from case to case and with a high
amount of unpredictability. With these characteristics parliament, finally, is
defended as the natural place, where the guidelines of the national policies have to
be elaborated, and the whole action of public administration has to be directed
and controled (Cheli 1981).
2.2 Premises and consequences of “parliamentary predominance"
(1) The practical functioning of parliament as a “central site" in this sense depends
from a variety of conjunctural and structural factors, which appear to make its
occurrence rather an exception:
- An accentuated social and political dynamics may conduce to the institutional
weakening of government centered circuits of decision-making, and enhance the
role of parliament as the ultimate public authority. This happened in the case of
Italy, where at the end of the fifth legislature, in 1969, union mobilizations and
asocial movements produced strong tensions in the political institutions. In
parliament thus was found the central motor of a system which after two decades
of profound cleavages tried to reestablish a minimally homogenous basis (Cheli
1981);
- Structural, nearly unique characteristics of a political system, as the permanent
exclusion of a major political force from government coalitions, may contribute to
enhance the pressure for "parliamentary centrality" as a form of recompensation -
as in the case of Italy and the PCI (Cotta 1987);
- The Italian chambers enjoyed a protagonism of a conjunctural nature especially
between 1976-1979, due to the contingent dynamics of the political forces, in
particular the experiment of "historical compromise" between DC and PCI and the
"governo di unita nazionale";
- Institutional reforms, on the other hand, may codify the practical attempts to
enhance parliamentary centrality. This happened with the reform of the Italian
parliamentary code in 1971, which
1 introduced the legislative programmation;
2. acknowledged to the chambers not only the powers of control and information,
but also those of instruction;
3. potentiated the cognoscitive activities, also by means of direct relations with
external apparatuses and social groups;
4. acknowledged strong guaranties to minorities.
(2) From the point of view of government and regime stability, the predominance of
parliament represents however rather a permanent threat than a desiderandum:
The governmental instability which was endemic to the parliamentary regimes in
Europe between the two world wars and after the second world war, especially in
Italy, Finland, the IV. French Republic and Belgium had an important part of its
origins in the excessive use of the parliamentary instruments of control and
censure vis-a-vis government: a third of the 120 changes of government defeat in a
motion of confidence; after 1945, most of these cases were produced during the
IV. French Republic (Montero 1985; Colliard 1978).
(3) The traditional notion of "parliamentary centrality" in the sense of predominance
is very much shaped by the dualistic institutionalist tradition in which parliament
and government are put in juxtaposition to each other (Cotta 1987). Political
science parliamentary research has since long overcome this dualistic and
partially ideological conception in favour of more differentiated classifications
(Jean Blodel 1973; Weinbaum 1975) and typologies of "parliament-executive
subsystems" (Cotta 1987).
(4) In practice, the function of "political direction" (indirizzo politico) -which should
unify the different state activities - even in the case of Italy is and was always
essentially performed by the political parties. The position of parliament with
respect to the determination of the government program, for instance, is secondary
and limited to simple votation without motivation or qualifications. This
extraparliamentary designation of the objectives and procedures for reaching them
is not even compensated by an effective parliamentary participation in the
selection of government personal. Only by their decisions in fixing the agenda of
the parliamentary works the conference of the parliamentary group leaders may
exercise some influence on the programmatic orientation of government, and the
standing committees may formulate substantial guidelines (resolutions) not so
much on general issues than on the sector level (Manzella 1975: 200ff).
2.3 "Parliamentary centrality" in terms of legitimation
Our intention is to redefine the concept of "parliamentary centrality" by
linking it with the process of democratic consolidation. Parliament in this view is
not only and not fundamentally central in so far as it possesses a capacity of taking
decisions, or even more of directing and controlling national policies and the
executive action. Its centrality may consist also, but not primarily, in its role in the
elaboration and codification of the constitutional chart.
More important is, first, at the moment of the "crafting of the rules of the
game", and eventually during their "recrafting" at a later point of time, the
suggestive capacity of parliamentary resources, rules and procedures to
incentivate the major actors either to enter into the spirit of parliamentary
negotiation and to participate in the democratic game, or, at least, to drop anti-
democratic strategies. Parliament contributes to the legitimation of the new regime
by requiring the collaboration or at least acquiescence of these major actors, be it
in appealing to their principles, or just to their instrumental interests. Secondly, the
first legislatures, it is the way how parliament structures its relations with parties
and interest groups which has an impact on how far the democratic commitment of
these actors may become principled and stable, and on whether they may arrive at
valorizing the principles of parliamentary democracy by themselves and not only for
instrumental reasons.
Limitations to the assembly regime and a "deprivation" of parliament of
part of its prerogatives (as e.g. the introduction of powers to dissolve parliament
on the part of the prime minister or president, popular referenda, transfer of nearly
all parliamentary powers to the president in exceptional situations; limitations on
the legislative powers and autonomy in agenda-setting) may not necessarily put
into question this parliamentary capacity to achieve legitimation.
Parliament, more than any other organ -be it an elected president, an
hegemonic party, or a representative government cabinet, possesses two
properties which consent it to play this important role in the legitimation of a new
democratic regime:
(1) Parliament possesses an amount of material and symbolic resources which
can benefit and consequently motivate a maximum of political actors, mainly
parties with the need to organize and develop their party-apparatuses electoral
appeals and mass following, as for instance:
- financial resources via parliamentary group financing
- recognition of the relative force of each party in terms of number of seats
- as a source of public prestige
- providing political and technical information
- incorporating an ensemble of fundamental principles of democratic order
(representation and civic participation; accountability of public authorities;
responsiveness towards citizens preferences and needs).
Thanks to these symbolic and instrumental resources parliament may
have an impact already in the pre-electoral phase in which the new order is still in
the state of experimentation, and some of the major actors are still undecided
about which strategy to choose and remaining outside or getting into the
parliamentary game.
(2) Parliament possesses a peculiar advantage which allows the
"parliamentarization" of the strategies of very different political actors. Parties at
the extreme left, moderate left, center and moderate or extreme right have
ideological traditions which are so different that it appears unconceivable to make
them compatible in a relatively short time period within a unique parliamentary
culture. Concepts of representation vary so extremely along the political spectrum
that we may wonder about the safety of the sources of parliamentary legitimation:
It is nothing more than the "fiction of representation" (Kelsen 1925) that serves to
legitimate parliament by resorting to the principle of popular souvereignty, hece
the idea that parliament is the representative of the people and the general good
and that the people can express their proper will only in and by the parliament
(ibd. 1982: 176/7). Against this concept of the role of the. deputy as
representative of the national interest, which is normally defended by the center,
stand the conception of representation as a mandate of specific sectors of
society, namely the working class, at the extreme Left, and the interpretations of
the role of the MP as representative of territorial interests, at the Right (8).
These divergences can be conserved and made compatible within a
certain margin thanks to the peculiar “ambiguity" of the parliamentary institution, of
its rules and procedures which allow for different and even contradictory
interpretations.
The reasons, interests or normative principles of the political actors that
participate in the parliamentary compromise can vary along a broad range. The
only important thing is that parliament during the process of consolidation
becomes central for their strategies, that they abandon their antiparliamentary or
extraparliamentary strategies and enter into a firm -active or passive- compromise
with it, be it in its majoritarian or in its consociational variant.
Parliamentary centrality in terms of “parliamentarization of the strategies of
political and social actors and of the general political climate" does hence not
depend necessarily on the parliamentary decision-making power, its role in the
elaboration of the constitution, the design of the parliamentary rules, the revision of
the pre-existing normative order, even if these powers may represent an important
incentive for the political actors. But participation in consensual decision-making
on major political issues can have also nigh costs in terms of the threatening the
identity of some of the more ideologized political parties vis-a-vis their following. A
subordinate parliament in terms of decision-making powers and of its position in
relation to the executive can be more efficient and less costly for these parties
because it allows the articulation of a symbolic opposition without the need to
participate in governmental responsibility.
3. The Conditions of Parliamentary Centrality
Which variables can introduce the bearing for the authority of parliament to
progressively become part of the social and political "climate" of a new
democracy, to substitute the coercitive power of the state and dissuasade social
an political groups to use violence and other means than those of parliamentary
bargain and exchange? 'Which factors explain that parliament may in some cases
play the role of a major protagonist during the instauration of a new democratic
system, like in Italy 1946/7 and in Spain 1977/8, but not in other cases, like in
Portugal and Greece where they became strengthened only in a second phase, or
in Turkey and Argentina where they remained in a subordinate position?
Certainly, there are numerous variables of different types which have a
potential bearing for our question: historical factors (transition mode, duration of
authoritarian regime), cultural determinants (parliamentary tradition), institutional
factors (electoral system; form of state and form of government and the
configuration of the parliamentary position within it), political conditions
(government-formula, existence of mass parties; decision-making system, system
of intermediation of interests), structural variables (economic development, cycle).
We will limit ourselves at picking five of them.
3.1. Parliamentary tradition
Certainly, the pre-existing parliamentary tradition and the length of the
authoritarian "interlude" play an outstanding role with respect to the degree to
which and the facility with which the political actors enter into the parliamentary
game. If an endogenous parliamentary tradition lacks or if it is wak, the leaders of
the transition may destinate additional resources to parliament: a strong position
of parliament in the new constitutional order, infrastructural equipment and financial
resources which may constitute alternative incentives for the political groups in
order to channel their demands and activities progressively towards the
parliamentary arena.
3.2 The Model of Decision-Making: Majoritarian versus Consociational
Which effects have the consociational model of parliamentary decision-
making on one side and the majoritarian model on the other on the centrality of
parliament in democratic consolidation? Both models may be able to strengthen
parliament, but in different ways (A. Lijphart 1984).
- The majoritarian model -in so far as it corresponds to "party government" and
follows the dynamics between a party in government with a stable parliamentary
support and a relatively strong parliamentary opposition-makes parliament the
scene where government and its politics are questioned in public -but corrected
only to a minor degree- and where the party and governmental elite is formed
(Cotta 1987). This model fundamentally stimulates those parties to enter -and
remain within- the game which gives the chances to win a majority or to enter into a
government-coalition, under the condition that alternance in government is
effectively possible.
- The "policentric model" of “government-parliament" relations, where the coalition-
government assists to connivances between some sectors of its own
parliamentary majority and the opposition, consents some influence to the daily
legislative work and hence- may incentivate those parties with even little chances
of entering into government but that represent certain sectors of society for which
they can gain some legislative advantage.
- Only in the case of the "grand coalition" model parliament is effectively
superfluent as a variable in democratic consolidation. This model lacks the
antagonistic relation between a governing majority and an opposition which is
substituted by a coalitional relation. Coalition-Government includes all major
parties with parliamentary representation. All these parties participate directly in
the resources commanded by the governmental office and hence are less
interested in the incentives provided by parliamentary representation.
It depends on the political landscape and the nature and degree of
polarization which one of these three models offers best chances and works best
in order to achieve democratic consolidation in a given case. A high degree of
polarization among the political forces' makes of course a "grand-coalition-model"
unthinkable; lack of party-consolidation makes the “majority-model" unworkable,
while a somehow blocked "rotation in government", a fluidity in the relationship
between majority and opposition, and a elevated degree of fragmentation in the
internal structure of parties may suggest some form of “policentrism" in
government-parliament relations.
3.3 Mass Parties
One of the most important variables with an impact on the role of
parliament in democratic consolidation is the existence of party organizations and
capable leadership, with the ability to channel social demands and at the same
time not too ideologized for choosing a consensus strategy on the most
fundamental questions of the new regime.
Only these conditions impede the military, a charismatic leader like a
president or a king to emerge from the crisis and decay of the preceding
authoritarian regime as the main leaders of a exclusionary transition process from
above, which normally would confine parliament to a marginal role, at least during
the transition and instauration period. If after the interval of dictatorship parties are
not too weak they may be the protagonists of the transition process in which
parliament will necessarily become more central for their political strategies.
3.4. Systems of interest intermediation: Pluralist, neocorporatist or
heterogenous?
According to the pluralist model of interest intermediation multiple interest
associations with competitive relations between each other and none of them
possessing a monopolistic position, maintain pressure -and lobbyist relations with
the different levels of state institutions. This model makes parliament a central
target of interest group strategies. Interest group influence normally becomes
relatively dispersed,, monopolistic economic power neutralized, and decision-
making processes remain to a large extent transparent to the public.
The neo-corporatist model, on the other side, in the sense of tripartite
arrangements with state, capital and labour representatives participating in the
processes of social concertation deprives, in its ideal-typical parliament of its
decision-making competences.
In reality however most systems of interest intermediation are of a mixed
type and institutionalize pluralist together with corporatist elements (Lehmbruch
1979,1983). As comparative research in different cases of interest intermediation
in Asia, Latin America and Europe has shown, social concertation normally is
more effective and strengthens the stability of a democratic regime if it is
integrated with pluralist elements which allow also weak oppositions to have some
manoebre-space (Bianchi 1986).
The attempt to realize a purer type of social concertation conduces
frequently to the convergence of social groups which before were opposed or
divided and to the emergence of new opposition movements with the capacity to
manace the stability of government and eventually of the regime (ibd.) A dualist or
competitive relationship between party-parliamentary and functional interest
intermediation conduces to social and political conflict, which may endanger a
process of democratic consolidation.
In order to consolidate -or reconsolidate- a democratic system which is
thus challenged by social conflict and protest -like Italy at the end of the sixties and
Spain since the general strike of the 14th of december 1988- parliament may play
a crucial role. Parliamentary instruments like plenary debates, legislative
propositions, resolutions with instructions for the government or the social parts,
hearings of the mobilized groups, may serve as mechanisms to transfer the conflict
from the streets into the aula and to compensate the shortcomings and failures of
neo-corporatist strategies.
The centrality of parliament in relation to the social forces varies with a
number of factors, for example:
- the intensity of the representational links which the parliamentary groups possess
with interest groups, including the extent of personal overlap;
- the range of instruments at the disposal of parliament and its standing
communities in order to establish direct relations with external groups or to realize
conoscitive activities.
The more central becomes parliament for interest groups, trade unions as
well as employers associations, peasant's interest groups and others the denser
become the networks of informal and formal interaction between them develop,
and the higher are the chances to integrate the economic interest groups into the
new institutional system and to prevent them from system-destabilizing strategies
(general strikes, investment strikes, capital flight etc.).
NOTES
(1) Case studies and comparative assessments on the role of
parliaments in the processes of democratic consolidation in Italy,
Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey are forthcoming; cf.
U.Liebert (ed.): Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in
Southern Europe; Frances Pinter, London 1989.
(2) The processes of liberalization and democratization which
occurred in the decade between the mid-seventies and the
mid-eighties in different areas of the world, above all in Southern
Europe, Latin and Central America, have stimulated the effort of a
number of political scientists -namely Geoffrey Pridham,
Leonardo Morlino, Philippe Schmitter, Giuseppe DiPalma- to fill
the gap in democratic theory with respect to the forms, conditions
and requirements of the consolidation of these new regimes. At
the time being, no single "theory of democratic consolidation"
(dc) has envolved. Instead, there are different conceptualizations
and hypotheses in discussion.
(3) In the preparatory phase severe struggles and polarisation rather than pluralism prevail, and the
country "is honestly facing, up to its particular conflicts and ... devising or adapting effective
procedures for their accommodation"; in the decision phase a "deliberate decision on the part
of political leaders to ... institutionalise some crucial aspect of democratic procedure" is taken,
a "conscious decision" that results from the interplay of a number of forces that establish an
explicit consensus. In the subsequent habituation phase the "agreement worked out during the
decision phase is now transmitted to the professional politicians and to the citizenry at large"
(Rustow 1970).
(4) Morlino distinguishes, hence, very much like Rustow, dc from the fluid and confuse period of
transition, as well as from the instauration phase in which the new institutions and procedures
are delineated, structured, formed and articulated.
(5) "An adequate theory of DC must be sensitive" to the fact that democracy "can be (and has
been) put into practice through a wide range of decision rules, eligibility criteria and specific
forums" (Schmitter 1987: 16).
(6) Morlino distinguishes between different levels or sites on which the consolidation of a
democratic regime occurs: that of the democratic state institutions; the relations between state
institutions; the parties and party system; the interest associations; the relations between
parties and associations with civil society; the relations between parties and associations and
state institutions. This allows him to formulate different types of “consolidation" according to
the main agents of and areas where consolidation is achieved. Consolidation can be hence
achieved mainly through parties; it can be of a "symbiotic" type and achieved through interest
associations and parties; and, thirdly, it can be "charismatic consolidation" (Morlino 1986a:
222f).
(7) To these belong the "electoral regime the "pressure regime", the "concertation regime", the
"clientelist regime" and the “representation regime" (Schnmitter 1987),.
(8) The plenary discussion on the "tráfico de influencias" in the Spanish Courts on the 22nd of
June, 1988 gave a telling illustration of the discrepancies among the different “philosophies" of
representation prevailing within the Spanish parliamentary Elite after more than a decade of
parliamentary institutionalization.
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